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PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE PROBLEM OF THE
NON-DESIGNING MANUFACTURER
I.

INTRODUCTION

Early in the development of product liability law, producers of
goods were held liable only for manufacturing defects. 1 More recently,
however, manufacturers have been held liable for design defects as
well.' It is thought that a product with a design defect subjects the user
to as great a risk as a product that is defective due to an error in the
manufacturing process.3 Although differing in interpretations of what
constitutes a defective design, 4 virtually all jurisdictions now hold a

1. The distinction between manufacturing defects and design defects has been explained by
many legal scholars as well as in numerous judicial opinions. A clear explanation was given by
Professor James Henderson, Jr.:
Manufacturing flaws are imperfections that inevitably occur in a typically small percentage
of products of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the manufacturing process. A
flawed product does not conform in some significant aspect to the intended design, nor does
it conform to the great majority of products manufactured in accordance with that design. . . . [On the other hand, products with a design defect] are unusually dangerous
because of the manner in which they are designed or marketed. Therefore, [a product
defectively designed] conforms to the intended design and is substantially identical in relevant aspects to all the other unflawed products manufactured according to the same design
or marketed in the same manner.
Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1543 (1973). Henderson's references to the marketing of the
product acknowledge that a design defect can consist of a failure to give proper warning if the
product cannot be made safe. See, e.g., Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386,
401-03, 451 A.2d 179, 187 (1982).
When a manufacturing defect exists, the manufacturer clearly has "caused" the harm and
imposing liability is not troublesome. This comment therefore will deal only with design defects,
which present a greater problem in relation to the non-designing manufacturer.
2. See generally 2 PROD. LIAa. (MB) § 16A[4] [f] [iv] (April, 1981 & Supp. 1983).
3. E.g., Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 525, 519 P.2d 421 (1974).
4. "It is now agreed on all sides that the concept of 'defect' plays a central role in the
development of the law of products liability. Yet the analysis of that concept has not yielded any
general statement of what kinds of conditions are included and what kinds are not." C. GREGORY,
H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 577 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
GREGORY].

In the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment i (1965), a product defect is defined
as a "condition of the product [which] makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."
The product is defective when it is "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics." Id. Even in states which have adopted § 402A, however, this
definition is not followed by all courts at all times. Furthermore, some states have adopted varying
versions of strict product liability, with different definitions of "defective." For a discussion of the
problems involved in arriving at a uniform definition of "defective" products, see GREGORY,
supra, at 577-78.
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manufacturer liable for harm caused by defectively designed products.'
A special problem arises, however, when the courts consider imposing
liability for design defects on a non-designing manufacturer-a manufacturer having no part in the design of a product but manufacturing it
in accordance with another party's specifications. 6
The question of the non-designing manufacturer provides an excellent forum for analyzing a struggle underlying all product liability litigation: namely the problem of accommodating the competing policy interests of compensating consumers for injuries versus protecting
manufacturers from excessive liability. To a large extent, shifts in the
balance between these very interests are responsible for many of the

dramatic changes which have occurred in product liability law in recent
years. 7 The conflict is especially strong in the case of the non-designing
manufacturer, where satisfying the valid interest in compensating innocent injured parties would require imposing liability for a design defect
on a manufacturer which had no part in designing the defective
product.

5. See generally 2 PROD. LIAB. (MB) § 16A [4] [fJ [iv] (April, 1981 & Supp. 1983).
6. A non-designing manufacturing arrangement most frequently arises when a business entity requires a specialized piece of equipment for its operations. The company therefore designs
the product to meet its own needs and contracts with a second company to produce the equipment
according to specifications which the designer supplies. (Often, the company providing the specifications is itself a manufacturer but is not equipped to produce the needed equipment.) Lawsuits
against the non-designing manufacturer arise when employees of the designing company are injured while using the equipment. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978)
(employee injured by electroplating equipment sued manufacturer which had produced the equipment according to her employer's specifications), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Lenherr v.
NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980) (injured employee of tire manufacturer sued
company which had produced a "squeegee machine," used in the manufacture of tires, according
to specifications provided by the tire manufacturer). See also Garrison v. Rohm and Haas Co.,
492 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1974); Weggen v. Elwell-Parker Elec. Co., 510 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Iowa
1981); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977); Michalko v. Cooke
Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
Similarly, a manufacturer requiring a specialized component part for its own end-product
might design the part to meet its requirements, and then contract to have another manufacturer
produce that part according to its specifications. See Orion Ins. Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (suit brought by the estate of a pilot killed in a helicopter crash
against the manufacturer of a component part of the helicopter. The component part had been
manufactured in accordance with design specifications furnished by the helicopter manufacturer).
Conceivably, a retailer desiring to sell a particular product might also contract with a manufacturer to produce that product according to its specifications.
7. In the past 20 years, the area of product liability litigation has undergone major upheavals and "enormous doctrinal shifts." GREGORY, supra note 4, at 547. The rapidity with which
changes have occurred in this area of the law is somewhat astounding. Some of the factors which
have had an influence on the development of product liability, as noted by one author, are "longarm jurisdiction; elimination or limitation of privity in most states; expansion of pre-trial discovery; extension of design and warning duties to include foreseeable misuse; and interpretation of
statutes of limitations to run from injury or its cause rather than the time of sale of the product."
Shea, Product Liability: A Continuing Process of Change, 68 A.B.A. J. 576, 576 (1982).
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The question of the non-designing manufacturer has received little
attention, perhaps because relatively few cases have presented the is-

sue.' Legal scholars have virtually ignored the subject. This comment
will attempt to partially fill that gap in legal literature, and will propose that non-designing manufacturers should be held liable for damage caused by design defects in goods they produce according to another's specifications. Imposing such liability would further the goals of
the doctrine of strict liabilityB--a doctrine which has been almost universally accepted. In addition, holding non-designing manufacturers liable would be consistent with other situations in which parties are held
liable though they are not at "fault." 10 Further, since liability would
exist only if the manufacturer produced a defective product,11 and because mechanisms exist by which the manufacturer can protect itself,1"
non-designing manufacturers would not be subject to an undue burden
of excessive liability.
II.

THE THEORIES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY

An understanding of the two different tort theories of product liability-negligence and strict product liability-is necessary before one
can analyze the issue of the non-designing manufacturer's liability. It is
especially important to focus on the competing interests underlying all
product liability litigation and to examine how each of the theories attempts to resolve the conflict.
A.

Negligence

A product liability action brought under a negligence theory applies traditional tort concepts of negligence to the manufacturer of
goods. 18 Thus, the manufacturer owes a duty of due care to a potential
user of the product, and can be held liable for damage caused by his
act or actionable omission in breach of that duty. 4 Under the objective

8. This fact was acknowledged by the United States District Court of Kansas, which stated
in 1980 that "there are very few reported cases on the liability of a manufacturer for a defectively
designed product when someone else is the designer." Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165,
174 (D. Kan. 1980).
9. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 57-62.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 63-66.
12. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
13. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641-44 (4th ed. 1971).
14. Id.; see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053
(1916). MacPherson was a major turning point in the development of product liability law. Prior
to the decision, courts steadfastly adhered to the traditional privity requirement, and a consumer
could bring an action for a defective product only against the retailer from whom he had purchased the product. Judge Cardozo's landmark decision in MacPherson abrogated the traditional
privity requirement for the first time, and applied negligence concepts in a suit brought by a
Published by eCommons,
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"reasonable manufacturer" standard generally applied, 15 the manufacturer will be held liable if he did not act to prevent a foreseeable harm
to a foreseeable user of the product.1 6
Through the reasonable manufacturer standard, the negligence
cause of action attempts to balance the compensation interest against a
historical reluctance to impose liability without fault.' 7 This approach
protects manufacturers against excessive liability by allowing injured
consumers to be compensated if, but only if, the manufacturer acted
negligently." Under this theory, a manufacturer which acted as carefully as it could reasonably be expected to act will not be liable if an
error nonetheless occurs. Central to the negligence formulation, then, is
the establishment of the manufacturer's fault for not being as careful
as the reasonable manufacturer would have been in manufacturing the
product. 9
The negligence cause of action frequently does not allow compensation because it imposes very difficult proof problems on the plaintiff."
Establishing the manufacturer's lack of care in testing a product, or
improper maintenance of quality control, is very difficult because the
plaintiff usually lacks direct access to this type of information." Additionally, in a design defect action based on negligence, the plaintiff
must be prepared to show that a better design was available and feasible for use.2 A great deal of expert testimony must therefore be used.
Even if the plaintiff can show that the manufacturer was negligent, the
suit is therefore likely to be very lengthy and expensive to litigate.
Thus, a negligence cause of action attempts to balance a societal
interest in compensating innocent victims against the opposing interest
of protecting manufacturers and sellers of products from excessive liability. Because of the proof problems which a plaintiff faces in the negligence action, however, the balance seems to tip dangerously in favor
of manufacturers. In order to shift the balance back toward the plaintiff2 3 and to facilitate compensation, the doctrine of strict product lia-

consumer directly against a product manufacturer.
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 644.
16. See id. at 643.
17. Id. at 17-19, 492.
18. Id. at 645.
19. See id. at 641-49.
20. Davis, Product Liability Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 514 (1980).
21. See GREGORY, supra note 4, at 553. Courts have frequently resorted to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to establish an inference of negligence when plaintiffs cannot point to specific acts
of negligence. See Davis, supra note 20, at 514.
22. See Davis, supra note 20, at 517-18.
23. Comment, The Government Contract Defense in Strict Liability Suits for Defective
Design, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 1030, 1048 n.104 (1981). The author discusses policy justifications for
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/5
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bility developed.
B.

Strict Product Liability

With the growing emphasis on consumer protection in the law,
courts and legislatures have sought to facilitate plaintiff recovery in

product liability actions." The vehicle for accomplishing this has been
the doctrine of strict product liability. Although different jurisdictions
have adopted widely varying versions of strict product liability, 25 the

strict product liability, observing that "[i]t sometimes is argued that strict products liability is
necessary to relieve the plaintiff of the difficult burden of proving negligence." Id.
24. In addition to compensation, several other rationales for strict product liability are frequently expressed. One of these is loss spreading:
The loss spreading rationale (for strict liability] recognizes the devastating burdens on a
consumer injured by a defective product. Strict liability instead places the burden on manufacturers and sellers who treat the cost as a cost of doing business. This ultimately is
passed on to future consumers of the product, and the injured person's loss is born by
society.
Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165, 174 (D. Kan. 1980). See also Comment, supra note
23, at 1048.
Another frequently expressed rationale for strict product liability is that applying the doctrine
furthers the goal of minimizing losses. The loss minimization rationale assumes that the manufacturer is in the best position to prevent product defects and thus minimize the losses that arise out
of the use of the product. This rationale was expressed by Judge Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (Traynor's
concurrence is famous for the variety of justifications it presents for strict liability for manufactured products). See also Vandall, Undermining Torts' Policies: Products Liability Legislation,
30 AM. U.L. REV. 673, 697-99 (1981) (rationale for strict product liability is placing burden on
party best able to prevent the accident); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970)
(proposing that the principal purpose of tort law should be to reduce the costs of accidents and the
costs of avoiding accidents).
Another rationale for imposing strict product liability is that it is equitable to do so. The socalled "corrective justice" argument for applying strict liability in products cases requires that we
"establish the causal connection between the plaintiff and the defendant's act ... and then ask
whether, prima facie, the loss should be placed upon the party who created that condition or the
party who suffered from it." GREGORY, supra note 4, at 554.
•25. Because jurisdictions have adopted different rules, and because rapid changes in product
liability law have caused confusion, there is no uniform standard for imposing product liability.
Shea, supra note 7, at 576. "The result is billions of dollars of potential liability exposure without
clear answers where the liability may fall or what should be done to minimize the risk." Id. A
clearer standard would aid litigation, be better for allocating risks, and better serve as an incentive
for manufacturers to exercise greater care. The more precise the standard, the better it can fulfill
these objectives. Davison, The Uncertain Search for a Design Defect Standard,30 AM. U.L. REV.
643, 645-46 (1981).
In order to alleviate the confusion and uncertainties of product liability law, there is growing
interest in federal legislation which would preempt state laws and establish uniform standards to
be applied in all product liability actions. The Product Liability Act, S. 2631, was approved by the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation in late 1982. For the Report of the
Senate Committee, see S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in [Extra Edition] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) No. 507 (Dec. 15, 1982). The committee report contains a discussion of the uncertainties of product liability litigation, the reasons that states cannot effectively
resolve them, and the ways in which the proposed federal product liability legislation will resolve
the problem. Id. at 2-10. See Shea, supra note 7, at 579 for arguments supporting the Product
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most commonly accepted version is the formulation of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts." Under the Restatement, a seller is liable for a defective product even when "the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product."2 7

The strict liability cause of action therefore facilitates a finding for

the plaintiff.2

Under section 402A and the other formulations which

have been adopted, the plaintiff pursuing a strict liability cause of action need not show that the manufacturer was negligent or at fault in
designing or manufacturing the product.2 The focus is on the defective
product rather than on the manufacturer's actions.30 The plaintiff need
only show that the product was defective, that the defect existed at the
time the product left the manufacturer's control, and that the defect is
causally linked to the injury the plaintiff suffered. 1 If these elements
are satisfied, the manufacturer will be held liable for the injury. Thus,
regardless of how careful the manufacturer may have been in the design or manufacture of the product, the mere fact of its defectiveness
will suffice to impose liability. 2 Consequently, a manufacturer which
prudently plans its product, tests the design, manufactures it with high
quality control standards and even tests it after the manufacturing process, can nonetheless find itself liable if the product proves to have an
undiscerned defect. Thus, the advantage for the plaintiff of the strict
Liability Act.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). "Judicial acceptance of the conditions of liability recited in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has been little short
of phenomenal. As the editors of the most widely used teaching materials in torts have said,
'Section 402A has literally swept the country.'" Davis, supra note 20, at 513 (emphasis and
footnotes omitted).

27. The

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1964) states as follows:

(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
28. Davis, supra note 20, at 518.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 672.
30. Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980); Michalko v. Cooke Color &
Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 50-52 & note
56 for discussion of the focus on the defective product in Lenherr and Michalko.
31. Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 172; Michalko, 91 N.J. at 394, 451 A.2d at 183; Preiser,
Defenses In Strict Tort Liability Actions, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 485, 487-88 (1982).
32. See Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 174, 176; Michalko, 91 N.J. at 395-96, 451 A.2d at 18384 (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/5
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product liability cause of action is that he or she need not show that the
manufacturer is at fault in order to assure compensation."3
A sub-strand of strict product liability has developed which does
focus on fault, but which still facilitates plaintiff compensation by not
requiring that the plaintiff prove the fault. In this line of cases, courts
have applied strict product liability principles by imputing knowledge
of the product defect to the manufacturer. The manufacturer is then
assumed to be at fault for marketing a product with a known defect.
Thus, the manufacturer can be held liable without requiring the plaintiff to put forth proof of fault." This strand of strict product liability
therefore also allows plaintiff compensation more easily than a negligence cause of action would, since the plaintiff does not have to prove
the manufacturer's fault.3 6
Essentially, then, a conflict ;between the competing societal interests in compensating injured parties and protecting manufacturers from
excessive exposure to liability underlies the product liability area of
law; the negligence and strict liability theories differ in the way they
attempt to resolve this conflict. As consumerism has become an increasingly important concern and the pendulum has swung toward the compensation side of this conflict, strict product liability has increasingly
been adopted as the vehicle by which the plaintiff's burden is eased and
compensation more readily allowed. Furtherance of the same policies
and interests which prompted the development and adoption of strict
product liability mandates that we impose liability on non-designing
manufacturers.
III.

ANALYSIS - APPLYING THE THEORIES AND POLICIES To THE
NON-DESIGNING MANUFACTURER

Under a negligence theory, courts have generally found no basis
for holding a non-designing manufacturer liable when a product design
proves defective.36 As one United States district court has stated,

33. See Davis, supra note 20, at 516-18. Davis compares the proof that is required of a
plaintiff under a negligence theory and under § 402A strict product liability. He concludes that,
although similar questions are involved in proving each cause of action, proof under § 402A is
easier because defective product design is proven more readily than is negligence.
34. Applying this reasoning, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that
[tihe focus in a strict liability case is upon the product itself. Knowledge of a product's
dangerous characteristics is imputed to the defendant. It is not necessary to prove that
defendant knew or should have known of the harmful attributes of its product while the
product was under its control in order to charge it with that knowledge.
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394-95, 451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982) (citations omitted).
35.

Id.

36. by
Lenherr,
504 F. Supp.
Published
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[i]t is logical to absolve a manufacturer from liability for a negligently
designed defective product when the manufacturer is not the designer

and plaintiff's theory of recovery is negligence. Under those circumstances a manufacturer is liable only if the defect in design is sufficiently
37
obvious to alert a reasonably competent manufacturer to the danger.

Thus, it is "the generally accepted rule that the manufacturer of a
product, built in accordance with plans and specifications of [a designer], will not be liable [in negligence] for damage occasioned by a
defect in those specifications, unless the plans are so obviously dangerous that no reasonable person would follow them." 38
In contrast, a manufacturer which produces a defectively designed
product would be liable under strict product liability theory, although
another party provided the design. Because strict product liability focuses on the defective product itself and does not require proof of
fault, 9 the fact that the manufacturer did not design the product is
irrelevant.
A number of courts, however, have been reluctant to apply the
40
doctrine of strict product liability to the non-designing manufacturer.
Apparently, these courts are fearful of allowing the pendulum to swing
too far toward the compensation interest and are concerned about exposing manufacturers to excessive liability. These courts have sought to
avoid imposing liability on manufacturers for design defects in products
that the manufacturers did not design.

37. Id. Lenherr involved an action brought by an injured employee against the manufacturer, who had produced the machine which caused the employee's injury. The machine had been
manufactured in accordance with specifications provided to the manufacturer by the plaintiff's
employer. The employee based her action solely on a strict product liability theory. The court
noted that very few cases have applied that doctrine in the context of the non-designing manufacturer. In ruling that the manufacturer was free from liability, the court distinguished between the
application of negligence and strict liability theories to the non-designing manufacturer situation.
Id.
38. Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1977) (citing RidIcy Investment Co. v. Croll, 56 Del. 208, 192 A.2d 925 (1963); Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601
(Fla. 1958); Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33 (1965)). In Castaldo, the court found that even the designer of the equipment in question was not liable under a
negligence theory because it had not designed the specific part of the equipment which caused the
injury. Since its "design responsibility was terminated prior to the selection of an appropriate
temperature-measuring instrument or its method of installation [the court found] no basis upon
which to hold [the designer] responsible for a design decision it never made." Id. See also Rivkin
& Silberfeld, Compliance With Product Specifications:Shield or Sword?, 17 FORUM 1012, 101314 (1982).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
40. Two commentators have analyzed the cases which have confronted the issue of compliance with product specifications, and concluded that "courts are divided over the question of
whether to permit the use of the defense of compliance with product specifications to claims
sounding in strict products liability in cases where the specifications are furnished by non-governmental entities." Rivkin & Silberfeld, supra note 38, at 1033-34.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/5
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Courts which have declined to apply the strict product liability

theory to non-designing manufacturers have injected negligence concepts into strict product liability actions. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, for example, applied Kentucky law and stated in Garrison v.
Rohm and Haas Company"1 that "the distinction between the so-called

strict liability principle and negligence is of no practical significance as
far as the standard of conduct required of the defendant is concerned.

In either event the standard required is reasonable care.' 2 Since the
product in controversy in Garrisonwas found not to be defective,"3 the
holding of no liability would have been the same under either negligence or strict product liability. However, the Garrison court reached

its decision circuitously, applying "standard of conduct" and "reasonable care" negligence concepts to a strict liability cause of action,"
where the focus should have rested solely on whether the product was

defective."" In a different fact situation, where a manufacturer is not
negligent but the product is defective, the "distinction between the so-

called strict liability principle and negligence"' 6 could have great pracaction it is not necestical significance, since in a strict product liability
47
sary to consider the manufacturer's fault.

The reluctance which the Garrison court and other courts have

exhibited toward imposing liability on non-designing manufacturers appears grounded in a fear of placing excessive liability on manufacturers
by holding them responsible for design defects in products which they
did not design. The policies underlying strict product liability,"' however, indicate that the doctrine should be applied. The United States

41. 492 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1974).
42. Id. at 351 (quoting Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg. Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. Ct. App.
1973)).
43. id.
44. Id.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
46. Garrison, 492 F.2d at 351.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33. The Fourth Circuit has also avoided imposing liability by declining to apply a strict liability theory independent of negligence principles. In
Spangler v. Kranco, 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973), an injured workman brought suit against a
manufacturer which built an overhead crane in accordance with specifications supplied by its customer. The suit charged that the manufacturer's failure to equip the crane with a warning device
rendered the crane inherently dangerous.
Spangler was originally brought under a negligence theory only, and the trial ended in summary judgment for the defendant because negligence was not proved. On appeal, the plaintiff
asked that strict product liability be considered as an amended theory of recovery. As in Garrison,
Spangler was ultimately decided on the fact that the product was not defective. However, the
court noted that the standard of safety imposed on the manufacturer of a product "is essentially
the same whether the theory of liability is labeled ... negligence or strict tort liability." 481 F.2d
at 375 n.2 (quoting Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971)).
23-24 and accompanying text.
48. bySee
supra notes 1983
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District Court in Kansas recognized this and correctly applied strict
product liability to a non-designing manufacturer in Lenherr v. NRM
49 The
Corporation.
Lenherr court distinguished between negligence and
strict product liability,5 0 pointing out that the latter could be imposed
"even if 'the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and
sale of his product ...... '" The court imposed liability on a manufacturer which had produced a defective machine according to another
party's specifications merely on the ground that the manufacturer had
produced the machine and put it into commerce for ultimate use by
52
consumers.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently relied on the
policies underlying strict product liability in holding a non-designing
manufacturer 5" responsible for a design defect. In Michalko v. Cooke
Color & Chemical Corporation54 the court focused primarily on the
compensation goal, stating that the most "significant" aspect of the
case was the fact that the plaintiff, an innocent party, was "grievously
injured," and that "as between plaintiff, an innocent user of the machine, and [the manufacturer], . . . it is incontestably fairer to impose
the cost of the accident on the latter."5 5 Desiring to allow compensation, the Michalko court properly applied strict product liability to the
non-designing manufacturer.5

49. 504 F. Supp. 165 (1980). The Lenherr court faced the necessity of applying Kansas law,
which had adopted strict liability but had "not spoken on the liability of a non-designing manufacturer of a product for a defective. design." Id. at 175. The court decided that "[biased on the
adoption of strict liability by the Kansas Supreme Court and the policies behind strict liability,
. . .the Kansas Supreme Court would hold a manufacturer liable under a theory of strict liability." Id.
50. Id. at 174.
51. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2) (1964)); see also Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
52. Id. at 176. For a discussion of retailers' and distributors' liability, see infra notes 57-59
and accompanying text.
53. The defendant in this case was not actually a product manufacturer. Rather, the suit
was brought by an employee, injured on a piece of industrial equipment, against an independent
contractor which had rebuilt parts of the equipment according to specifications provided by the
equipment owner, plaintiff's employer. The court acknowledged, however, that the principles of
strict liability for a manufacturer "apply with similar force to one engaged in rebuilding machines." Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 395, 451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982).
The difference between a manufacturer and an independent contractor which rebuilds parts of a
product is not important for the purposes of,this comment. Therefore, the contractor in Michalko
will be referred to as a "manufacturer" for consistency with other cases discussed.
54. 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982).
55. Id. at 398-99, 451 A.2d at 185. This emphasis also exemplifies the "corrective justice"
rationale for strict product liability. See supra note 24.
56. The Michalko court concluded that
the fact that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of the [designer) does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for the manufacturer of a defective product ....
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/5
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Thus, imposing liability for design defects on non-designing manufacturers is consistent with and furthers the policies our society has
chosen to promote through the development of strict product liability.
Additionally, imposing liability on non-designing manufacturers is consistent with other situations in which parties are held liable although
they are without "fault." Indeed, "[b]ecause liability exposure created
by section 402A employs the term 'sells' 57 . . . it encompasses retailers
and wholesalers who may have had nothing to do with the design or
.. "8 Thus, liability has been imposed on
assembly of a product ..
sellers who merely purchase for resale;5 on sellers of used products; 60
and on manufacturers of an entire product for a defective component
part purchased from another party. 61 As one United States district
court has observed, "the non-designing manufacturer's role in a products liability action for a design defect is analogous to the role of a
retailer or distributor in an action for a manufacturing defect." 62
Clearly, then, imposing liability on the non-designing manufacturer is
not a radical departure from situations in which we have already imposed strict liability. The imposition does not create a new type of liability; rather, it merely calls for applying the doctrine of strict product
liability as it already exists to a new set of factual circumstances. The
imposition is no more burdensome on the non-designing manufacturer
than on any other "seller" held liable without fault.
Furthermore, because it focuses only on defective products, e3 strict
product liability theory is not unnecessarily harsh on the non-designing
manufacturer. A manufacturer will not be held liable by virtue of
merely making a product; for liability to be imposed, the product must
be defective. Repeatedly, courts and legal scholars have pointed out
that even under strict product liability, "a manufacturer [is] not an

...
[A]dherence to or reliance upon the [designer's] plans ... is irrelevant. 'It is not
necessary to show that the defendant created the defect. What is important is that the
defect did in fact exist when the product was distributed by and was under the control of
the defendant.'
Id. at 395-96 (quoting Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170, 406 A.2d
140, 150 (1979)).
57. See supra note 27.
58. Davis, supra note 20, at 529 (emphasis added).
59. The Lenherr court referred to the role of a retailer or distributor in a strict liability
action for a manufacturing defect. "The [retailer or] distributor is liable under the strict liability
requirements although he exercised extreme care. His liability exists by reason of his position in a
chain of distribution to the consumer and the policy considerations behind the adoption of strict
liability." Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 176.
60. See generally 2 PROD. LIAB. (MB) § 16A[4] [b] [iv] (May, 1980).
61. See generally id. at § 16A[4] [b] [i] (Aug. 1977).
62. Lenherr, 504 F. Supp. at 176.
notes 28-33.
63. bySee
supra text accompanying
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insurer that its product [is] incapable of producing injury."6 Where a
driver whose automobile left the road and collided with a signpost
brought an action against the manufacturer of the signpost, 65 for example, the Supreme Court of Illinois found no liability and stated that
[a] manufacturer is not under a duty in strict liability to design a product which is totally incapable of injuring those who foreseeably come in
contact with the product. Products liability does not make the manufacturer an insurer of all foreseeable accidents which involve its products.
Virtually any product is capable of producing injury when put to certain
uses or misuses. . . .Injuries are not compensable in products liability if
they derive merely from those inherent properties of a product which are
obvious to all who come in contact with the product. The injuries must
derive from a distinct defect in the product, a defect which subjects those
exposed to the product to an unreasonable risk of harm. 6
Thus, the focus on defective products mitigates what some may perceive as an undue harshness of imposing liability on the non-designing
manufacturer. Although the manufacturer did not design its product,
the manufacturer did put a defective product into the marketplace.
When viewed in this light, and in accordance with the policies underlying strict product liability, imposing liability on the non-designing manufacturer does not seem unnecessarily harsh.
Moreover, non-designing manufacturers will not be unduly burdened because they may employ several mechanisms to reduce their
liability exposure. A manufacturer which is unwilling to assume the
risk of liability for a product it did not design can, for example, include
a provision for indemnification in its manufacturing contract with the
product designer. In other words, the manufacturer can contractually
allocate the risk of liability.
Another mechanism by which the manufacturer can reduce its liability exposure is the use of liability insurance. As the doctrine of strict
product liability has developed, insurance protection has become increasingly important to manufacturers. Recognizing this, insurers have

64. Garrison v. Rohm and Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1974).
65. Hunt v. Blasius, 74 I1. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978).
66. Id. at 211, 384 N.E.2d at 372 (citing Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 111.
2d 456, 467,
343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976)). The Blasius court found no liability because the plaintiff had "al-

leged no legally cognizable defect in the sign post [and] [t]he risks which inhered in the collision
with the post were the same risks which attend all collisions between motorists and stationary
objects which align the highway." Id. at 212, 384 N.E.2d at 372. See also Spangler v. Kranco,
Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (summary judgment for a defendant manufacturer which had

produced a crane according to specifications supplied by the injured plaintiff's employer. "There
was no defect in the crane itself nor in it any latent quality which caused [plaintiff's] injury." Id.
at 375.).
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made broader coverages available.6 7 Through liability insurance, manufacturers can "spread the risk" so that no single party need bear the
burden of a loss.6 8 Eventually, consumers absorb the loss by paying
higher prices for goods because the manufacturer passes on its insurance costs. The cost of the loss is thus spread among all consumers
rather than requiring the injured party to bear it alone. At the same
time, the manufacturer is not subjected to an excessive burden.
The non-designing manufacturer is further protected by the availability of an indemnity action against the party which designed and
provided specifications for the defective product. Legal commentators
have pointed out that compliance with product specifications can be
used by a manufacturer as a "sword"-"a means of passing on some or
all of the manufacturer's alleged liability to the designer." 6 9 As these
authors have noted, the use of compliance with product specifications
0
as a basis for indemnification is easily justifiable on policy grounds.
71
Accordingly, indemnity actions have been allowed, under contract
to intheory, by assuming an implied promise by the product designer
7
2
defective.
proves
product
the
if
manufacturer
the
demnify

67. For a discussion of product liability insurance for manufacturers, see 3A PROD. LIAD.
(MB) § 50 (Aug. 1982). But see Shea, supra note 7, at 578. Professor Shea argues in support of
federal product liability legislation. He maintains that the need for such legislation is due in part
to the failure of insurance to meet the needs of manufacturers.
68. See supra note 24.
69. Rivkin & Silberfeld, supra note 38, at 1013.
70. A designer, expert in the field, who has specified a defective product is far more
culpable than a manufacturer who, without any negligence on his part, produces the product exactly as specified. Moreover, one of the purposes of tort liability is to prevent the
occurrence of future harm. Hence, such liability should be borne primarily or entirely by
the entity which is in the best position to correct the tortious act and prevent future torts of
a similar nature. That entity plainly is the designer, who can achieve the desired result
simply by changing the specifications to eliminate the defect.
Id. at 1026 (footnote omitted).
71. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978) (employee injured on
equipment designed by her employer brought suit against the non-designing manufacturer. Third
party action for contribution and indemnity by employer/designer allowed), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
916 (1979); Weggen v. Elwell-Parker Elec. Co., 510 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (third party
indemnity action allowed by defendant non-designing manufacturer against equipment designer).
The Weggen court held that the "general rule ... that indemnity is not available to the manufacturer of a defective product from its purchaser" is inapplicable where the purchaser has supplied
the specifications for the product. Id. at 254. The court reasoned that the contract for manufacture according to specifications "produced a designer/fabricator relationship instead of the ordinary vendor/vendee relationship," id., and determined that "a purchaser's input into the specifications and design modifications may be so intrusive, specialized and specific that it gives rise to an
independent duty requiring the purchaser to use due care in the design and specification." Id. If
this duty is breached and the design or specifications are defective, indemnity is available. Id. at
255.
72. The principle of law underlying the theory of implied contractual indemnification
based solely on compliance with product specifications is ... that a party who furnishes
product specifications impliedly promises to use due care in designing the product. This
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CONCLUSION

Historically, our legal system has been hesitant to impose liability
without "fault." Because a non-designing manufacturer did not design
the product it produces, imposing liability when the design proves defective seems somewhat troublesome. The manufacturer is not at fault
for the product design, so imposing liability may seem inequitable. On
the other hand, however, a plaintiff who has been injured by a defectively designed product is seeking compensation. The plaintiff, also, is
without fault. Who should prevail?
The tension between compensating injured consumers and protecting manufacturers from excessive liability underlies all product liability
litigation. Over the past two decades, strict product liability has grown
as a way of accommodating this tension. Strict product liability favors
the compensation side of the scale by removing some of the proof
problems that plaintiffs had under negligence actions, and thus makes
it easier for plaintiffs to prevail.
Imposing liability on non-designing manufacturers would further
the compensation goal and would therefore be consistent with the policy our legal system has adopted in developing strict product liability.
Additionally, this imposition would be consistent with other situations
in which parties are liable without fault. Furthermore, non-designing
manufacturers would not be subjected to undue hardship because protections are available through contractual allocation of risk, liability
insurance, and suit against the product designer for indemnification.
Given these mechanisms available to the manufacturer to protect itself
and the societal interest in compensation, non-designing manufacturers
should be held liable for design defects.
Ellen S. Leffak

implied promise gives rise to a further obligation on the part of the designer to indemnify
the manufacturer if the product turns out to be unsafe in design and causes injury or
damages for which the manufacturer is held liable.
Rivkin & Silberfeld, supra note 38, at 1028.
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